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Summer Policy Colloquium Archives
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Collaborate, Cooperate, Co-locate
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EARTH SCIENCE AND APPLICATIONS FROM SPACE:
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Preparing Assessments that Evaluate the
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The Supply of Natural Resources Information Infrastructure: Issues in the Theory and Practice of Estimating CostsA Case Study prepared for the 2007 Summer Policy Colloquium The collection and analysis of information about natural resources, the environment, and weather places heavy reliance on physical infrastructure. Estimating the cost of infrastructure is difficult for many reasons; ensuring accurate estimates is even more difficult given the tendency for contracting mechanisms to induce downward biases. This paper has reviewed the conceptual and empirical literature on cost estimation and associated contract design to highlight some of these problems and outline possible approaches to ameliorating them.
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The Federal Resonse to Hurricane KatrinaA Case Study prepared for the 2006 Summer Policy Colloquium In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina in 2005, the White House, the United States Senate, and the U.S. House of Representatives conducted independent investigations of what had gone wrong. By and large, their conclusions addressed deficiencies in the emergency response. Certainly that emergency response could have been much improved, saving many lives. But what about the loss of 200,000 homes? A comparable number of jobs? What could government at all levels have done to reduce the economic disruption of the region and speed the recovery? This case study examines these broader aspects of the disaster.
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Climate Change Negotiations: Past, Present, and FutureA Case study prepared for the 2005 Summer Policy Colloquium By Scott Barrett In the history of large scale, international negotiations, probably no issue has attracted as much attention as global climate change (the previous record holder was probably the Law of the Sea negotiations). For over 15 years, numerous negotiating sessions have been held, involving crowds of negotiators (a diplomat once told me that there were 50 members of a US negotiating team attending one of the sessions). Supporting these public efforts have been countless domestic meetings among specialized agencies and ministries, huge efforts by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change to synthesize and organize the scientific evidence, and much more besides. The input into this process has been unprecedented. And yet all this effort has made little difference. So far, two agreements have entered into force—the Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol—but neither will do much to mitigate or forestall climate change. One purpose of this case study is to explain why. |
Issues at the forefront of public policy for environmental RiskA Case study prepared for the 2005 Summer Policy Colloquium By Molly K. Macauley The lay of the policy land for addressing and managing environmental risk includes the hillock of the precautionary principle, the mountain of the practice and ethics of monetary valuation, and the tectonic plates of real-world innovations in markets and trading exchanges for nonmarketed environmental goods. This paper offers an overview of these contemporary and as yet unresolved issues and asks how each might be addressed in disparate environmental risks such as lightning, climate change, and severe weather. |
Is the Vision of the Earth Observation Summit Realizable?A Case Study prepared for the 2004 Summer Policy Colloquium By Molly K. Macauley This paper discusses the rationale for and challenges of the summit's objectives. The paper is not intended to argue for or against the Global Earth Observing System of Systems (GEOSS) but rather, it considers whether the GEOSS vision is realizable, given its stated goals, and what steps might enable further progress towards the goals. Space-derived observations seem to be the focus in summit documents prepared to date, although in-situ measurements, particularly of land surface, ecological, and human health parameters are highly important for their data content as well as their use in validating and verifying space data. Most of the examples offered in the paper use space-derived earth observation data, but the general concerns raised here about the difficulties in realizing the vision of the summit pertain to both space-derived and in situ data. The paper also suggests a wholly different objective for the summit, namely the opportunity for GEOSS to serve as the internationally agreed technical and institutional means of monitoring compliance with international environmental and natural resources agreements. Such an objective is a radically different and no doubt much more politically sensitive function than envisioned at the summit. The objective is essential for global sustainable development, however, and is ideally provided by an internationally coordinated earth observing system such as GEOSS. |
THE IMPROBABLE MONTREAL PROTOCOL: SCIENCE, DIPLOMACY, AND DEFENDING THE OZONE LAYERA Policy Case Study Prepared for the 2004 Policy Colloquium By Richard Elliot Benedick Introduction: In January 1985, not long after I took over the international environment portfolio at the State Department, I led a small American delegation to a little-noticed meeting in Geneva . There, the U.S., Canada, and a few like-minded countries tried, and ultimately failed in the face of strong opposition from other governments, to achieve a multilateral agreement to limit use of chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs). The event attracted only perfunctory attention in the press, and its unremarkable results occasioned no diplomatic ripples in national capitals. For three years, this awkwardly titled Ad Hoc Working Group of Legal and Technical Experts for the Preparation of a Global Framework Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, an assemblage of diplomats, environmental officials, and government lawyers under the auspices of a small UN agency, the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), had struggled in vain to reach a consensus on controlling CFCs. Two months later, a handful of countries signed the Vienna Convention for Protection of the Ozone Layer, a toothless treaty to encourage ozone research that did not even mention CFCs in its text. The following year, I was asked by Secretary of State George Shultz and Ambassador John Negroponte, then Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans, Environmental, and Scientific Affairs (OES), to lead negotiations for a protocol on controlling CFCs. Very few gamblers would have wagered at that time that such negotiations could succeed. CFCs were virtually synonymous with modern standards of living, finding new uses in thousands of products and processes. Billions of dollars of international investment and hundreds of thousands of jobs worldwide were involved. Technological alternatives were nonexistent or considered too costly or unfeasible. Powerful governments and global economic interests were aligned in adamant opposition to controls, as were ideological elements within the administration of President Reagan. Still other governments and publics were unaware or indifferent to an arcane threat. Perhaps most significant of all, the arguments for control rested on unproven scientific theories: throughout the protocol negotiations there was firm evidence neither of the predicted ozone layer depletion nor of any harmful effects. Yet, in September 1987 an international accord was signed in Montreal that made headlines around the globe. By 1989, protection of the ozone layer figured prominently in discussions among the world's political leaders. Within a short time, whole classes of hitherto indispensable chemicals were being phased out and industries were being transformed. CFCs and ozone had become, literally, household words. The heads of the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) and UNEP later wrote that “the action to defend the ozone layer will rank as one of the great international achievements of the century.” [1] Under conditions of great scientific uncertainty and political and economic opposition, the negotiators of the Montreal Protocol averted grave dangers to life on Earth. The protocol also set a number of important precedents that influenced the great wave of environmental diplomacy of subsequent years, including several international treaties as well as the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development and Agenda 21. What happened between the publication of controversial scientific theories in 1974 and the signing of a landmark treaty in 1987, together with the subsequent evolution of that treaty, is a fascinating and instructive example of how science and diplomacy can effectively interact to address a global threat. [1] G.O.P.Obasi and Elizabeth Dowdeswell, Foreword to R. Bojkov, The Changing Ozone Layer , Geneva : WMO/UNEP, 1995. |
Private-Public-Academic Roles and Responsibilities in the Atmospheric SciencesA Case Study Prepared for the 2003 AMS Summer Policy Colloquium Prepared by Roger A. Pielke, Jr, University of Colorado Overview: For decades members of the atmospheric sciences community have discussed and debated the proper roles and responsibilities of government, business and academia in the provision of products and services. Such issues are common across many areas of science and technology, and are typically considered a matter of "technology policy." This case study provides a guided tour of this debate, setting the stage to ask the question: where next? |
The Development of the
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A Herculean Task? Economics, Politics, and Realigning Government
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PART I DATA EXCHANGE
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Atmospheric Science and the Constitution of Public Policy:
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The Environmental Foundation
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